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SHOULD THE ROOSTER GUARD THE HENHOUSE:
EVALUATING THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
DISABILITY ACT OF 1980
Donald E. Campbell*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 21, 2006, Judge Manuel L. Real, a federal district court
judge from the Central District of California, appeared before a subcom-
mittee in the United States House of Representatives.' The hearing was to
determine whether articles of impeachment should be recommended
against Judge Real, a 1966 appointee of President Johnson. At the time of
the hearing, Real had become the poster-judge for a federal judiciary out
of control-with the perception that the bench was composed of judges
serving for life with absolute power and no effective method of ensuring
accountability for misconduct.2
The events leading Judge Real to the subcommittee hearing read like
the plot of a John Grisham novel. The accusations centered on irregulari-
ties in the handling of the case of Deborah Canter.3 Ms. Canter first ap-
peared before Judge Real when she pled guilty to the criminal charges of
making false statements and loan fraud.' In that case, Judge Real placed
her on probation and sentenced her to community service.' At the time
Canter was facing the criminal charges, she was also going through a con-
tested divorce and faced eviction from the home she and her husband
rented prior to their separation because she had stopped paying rent.' At
that time Canter filed bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court subsequently
entered an Order lifting the automatic stay, allowing the owner of the
property to evict Canter.
At this point, "lightning struck" and "[w]ithout notice, without warn-
ing, without giving . . . an opportunity to oppose, without so much as a
* Visiting Professor of Law at Mississippi College School of Law. The author thanks Mr.
Robert Quimby for his invaluable assistance.
1. Impeaching Manuel L. Real, A Judge of the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, for High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellec-
tual Property).
2. After reading the transcript of the impeachment hearing before the Subcommittee, it be-
comes clear that this hearing, while certainly centered around the conduct of Judge Real, was focused
on the process itself and on questioning how well the current disciplinary system works.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. See also Terry Carter, Real Trouble, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2008, at 45 (discussing Canter's case
as well as other potential misconduct by Judge Real).
6. In re Canter, 299 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002).
7. See id. at 1152-56 (holding that Real's assumption of jurisdiction in the case was improper).
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motion, [Judge Real] withdrew the case from the bankruptcy court."8
Twelve days after assuming the bankruptcy case, Judge Real enjoined the
judgment evicting Canter from her home-once again without the "usual
processes to which we are accustomed in American courts"-such as notice
and an opportunity to oppose the Order.9 The entire process was shrouded
in mystery. Judge Real's Order "gave no reasons, cited no authority, made
no reference to a motion or other petition, imposed no bond, balanced no
equities.""o
The effect of Judge Real's Order staying the eviction was to allow
Canter to stay in the home rent-free.n When lawyers for the owner of the
home (a Trust) filed a motion seeking to have the stay lifted, Judge Real
summarily denied the motion, shedding no light on the justification for his
actions:
MR KATZ: And the motion to lift the stay is denied?
THE COURT: Denied, that's right.
MR. KATZ: May I ask the reasons, your Honor?
THE COURT: Just because I said it, Counsel.12
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held it was an abuse of discretion for Judge
Real to assume oversight of Canter's bankruptcy case."
The reason Judge Real assumed oversight of Canter's bankruptcy case
and stayed the eviction is disputed. One theory was that Canter wrote a
"secret letter" to Judge Real seeking his assistance with the eviction.14
While both Canter and Judge Real deny that such a letter existed, Canter's
former attorney stated that his secretary acted as a ghostwriter for
Canter." This entire episode would have gone unchallenged but for the
fact that a lawyer (not involved in the Canter case) filed a judicial miscon-
duct complaint against Judge Real, alleging:
It would appear to a reasonable observer who knew all
these facts that something inappropriate happened here, be-
yond what the court discussed. What I mean to say is that it
appears that Judge Real acted inappropriately to benefit an
attractive female whom he oddly had placed on probation
to himself, and, if this occurred, then it would constitute ex-
treme judicial misconduct."
8. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2005).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1195. It was estimated that rent would have been approximately $35,000 from the entry
of Judge Real's Order until her ultimate eviction. Id.
12. Id. at 1184.
13. In re Canter, 299 F.3d at 1156.
14. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d at 1189.
15. Id.
16. Hearings, supra note 1, at Exhibit "B" (testimony of Manuel Real).
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Judge Real claimed that the accusations were filed by a disgruntled attor-
ney with a "personal vendetta" against him."
The filing of the complaint triggered the procedures set out in the Judi-
cial Conduct and Disability Act for handling allegations of judicial miscon-
duct. The Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit first received and reviewed the
complaint. After reviewing the allegations, the Chief Judge made no inves-
tigation and dismissed the Complaint stating that the Complaint failed to
state any "objectively verifiable proof" to substantiate the allegations."s
The dismissal was then appealed to the Judicial Council. The Judicial
Council remanded to the Chief Judge for further investigation-specifi-
cally, whether Judge Real had acted to assist Canter because he had re-
ceived the alleged secret letter.1 9 On remand, the Chief Judge obtained the
denials from Real and Canter and determined "there is no basis for a find-
ing that credible evidence exists of a letter or other 'secret communica-
tion"' from Canter to Real (the Chief Judge did not contact the alleged
ghostwriting secretary).20
The dismissal was then appealed to Judicial Council, and, in a two-
page opinion, the Judicial Council stated that the "suggestion [in the com-
plaint] of an inappropriate personal relationship with the petitioner is en-
tirely unfounded"-relying on the factual findings of the Chief Judge.2 1
Judge Kozinski wrote a strongly worded dissent questioning the handling of
Judge Real's case. In his dissent he made the following prophetic state-
ment regarding the handling of judicial misconduct complaints:
Pleasant or not, it's a responsibility we accept when we be-
come members of the Judicial Council, and we must dis-
charge it fully and fairly, without favor or rancor. If we
don't live up to this responsibility, we may find that Con-
gress - which does keep an eye on these matters . . . . will
have given the job to somebody else, materially weakening
the independence of the federal judiciary.2 2
The Judicial Council order did not end the Judge Real saga however.
After the Judicial Council affirmed the Chief Judge, the claimant appealed
the dismissal to the Judicial Conference.2 3 A committee was appointed to
hear and decide the appeal.2 4 The Committee's ultimate determination
was that it had no authority to investigate the Complaint further because
17. Hearings, supra note 1 (testimony of Sen. Lamar Smith, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property).
18. Hearings, supra note 1, at Exhibit "C" (testimony of Manuel Real).
19. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d at 1189.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1180.
22. Id. at 1183.
23. In re Opinion of Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and
Disability Orders, 449 F.3d 106, 108 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2006).
24. Id.
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the Chief Judge dismissed the Complaint without appointing a special com-
mittee to prepare a report.25 The quirk of procedure which denied the
Conference jurisdiction to consider the potential misconduct was not lost
on the members of the committee: "Admittedly, under the statutory
scheme . . . a chief judge may avoid review by the Judicial Conference ...
by the simple expedient of failing to appoint a special committee . . . and
instead dismissing the complaint .... "26 In dissent, Judge Winters raised
questions about the current regulatory scheme itself: "A self-regulatory
procedure suffers from the weakness that many observers will be suspicious
that complaints against judges will be dissolved, will be disfavored. The
Committee's decision in this case can only fuel such suspicions." 27 Thus, the
judicial misconduct proceedings ended, and the Impeachment proceedings
began.
The purpose of this Article is to critically examine the aspect of the
Act which seems to invite the most criticisms and raise the most questions
of impropriety - namely, the initial receipt, review, and investigation of
misconduct complaints. If the complaint against Judge Real had received
adequate attention at the outset, the outcome may not have been different,
but judicial resources would have likely been saved and the black-eye the
handling of the case gave the judiciary could have been avoided. This arti-
cle proposes that the current process of receiving, reviewing, and investi-
gating judicial misconduct complaints should be amended. Specifically, the
Act should incorporate into the current system an initial review and inves-
tigation by a magistrate judge. To this end, Part II sets out the procedures
of how complaints are currently handled under the Act. Part III then dis-
cusses the constitutional limitations for designing a judicial misconduct pro-
cess, and the practical criticisms and limitations of the current process. Part
IV looks at recent congressional proposal for altering consideration of judi-
cial misconduct complaints-adoption of an inspector general. Finally,
Part V proposes that instead of an inspector general, Congress should con-
sider amending the current judicial misconduct Act to require the appoint-
ment of magistrate judges to initially receive, review, and investigate
misconduct complaints.
II. THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980:
A BRIEF LOOK AT THE PROCEDURE
Judge Real's case is simply the latest example that has caused Con-
gress to question how complaints of judicial misconduct are handled.28
25. Id. at 109.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 117 (Winters, J., dissenting).
28. See Patrick Donald McCalla, Judicial Disciplining of Federal Judges is Constitutional, 62 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1269-71 (May 1989) (discussing proposed congressional legislation authorizing pro-
cedures for judicial discipline short of impeachment); Stephen B. Burbank & S. Jay Plager, Foreward:
The Law of Federal Judicial Discipline and the Lessons of Social Science, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (Nov.
1993) ("Politicians have been concerned about the difficulty of removing federal judges at least since
Thomas Jefferson's failed attempt to make an example of Justice Chase. Proposals to make removal
384 [VOL. 28:381
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While the fires of congressional concern are often stoked with regard to
judicial discipline, very rarely does any change take place. The lack of any
significant change to the current regulatory system stems from a number of
factors. One is that while congressional interest peaks when a high profile
case enters the public consciousness, the interest quickly dissipates-either
because the issue leaves the headlines or because the issue is not suffi-
ciently electorally salient to expend the resources to push for reform.29 The
result of these electoral realities is that a disgruntled member of Congress
may demand a hearing, but any impetus to create real change is quickly
overcome by other demands on the member's time. This reality changed
however in the immediate aftermath of Watergate, when the momentum
and inertia of that scandal made the question not whether to address judi-
cial misconduct but how to fashion a system that maintained respect for
judicial independence while at the same time ensuring that no one - includ-
ing federal judges - were exempt from accountability for their actions.3 0
This need to walk the "tightrope between independence and accountabil-
ity" resulted the passage of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act."
The difficulty Congress faced when drafting the current Judicial Con-
duct and Disability Act, and will continue to face when considering any
reform, is that issues of judicial misconduct are of constitutional propor-
tions. The Constitution provides that officers - such as federal judges -
may only be removed from office by impeachment. Article III judges
"hold their Offices during good Behaviour. . ." and may be removed from
office if impeached or convicted of "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."3 2 The question is whether any action or discipline less
than formal impeachment proceedings violates this constitutional man-
date.3 3 For example, if a judge becomes incapacitated and cannot effec-
tively handle her docket, may Congress authorize the removal of cases
from her docket or suspend receipt of new cases so she receives no new
cases? Does such conduct constitute an unconstitutional attempt to re-
move a judge in a manner short of impeachment? If the answer to the
easier, substantively and procedurally, whether by constitutional amendment or statute, are common
throughout our history."); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 291-301 (Dec. 1982).
29. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, Judicial Discipline: A Legislative Perspec-
tive, 76 Ky. L.J. 763, 764-66 (1988).
30. This is certainly not to say that attempts to regulate judicial conduct had not generated pro-
posed legislation. There have been a number of laws proposed, but the post-Watergate political land-
scape provided both the opportunity and the electoral saliency to justify passage of an Act. See Patrick
Donald McCalla, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1269-71 (May 1989) (discussing legislation proposed between
1936 and 1980).
31. Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search for Fairness, Independence, and
Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 678 (2001).
32. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4. The Constitution places the power of impeachment in the House of
Representatives and the power to try impeachments in the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 and
art 1, § 3, cl. 6.
33. See Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Speech, 88 YALE L. J. 681 (March 1979) (arguing
that providing discipline for federal judges in any manner other than impeachment would compromise
judicial independence).
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latter question is "yes," then Congress is left solely with the formal im-
peachment process, which has been described as an "unwieldy and insuffi-
cient means of disciplining judges," because the process is cumbersome,
and because rarely does conduct rise to the level set out by the Constitu-
tion as an impeachable offense.34 In fact, impeachment charges have been
brought against only thirteen federal judges in the history of the nation. Of
these thirteen (including Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase), four were
acquitted, seven were removed from office, and two judges resigned prior
to a trial on the articles of impeachment."
With passage of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, Congress
sought a method for dealing with deviant or disabled judges when their
misconduct does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. The 1980
legislation 3 6 provided a mechanism for addressing such misconduct which,
while not impeachable, brings public disrepute to the judiciary." The legis-
lation ultimately adopted was a compromise between competing interests.
The judicial branch lobbied for legislation that would protect the power
and discretion of the judiciary to regulate itself.3 8  Some members of
Congress, on the other hand, offered alternatives which tended to give
34. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 680. Reasons for congressional reluctance to utilize the impeach-
ment procedures include (a) the cost of a lengthy impeachment proceeding which is not likely to result
in an equal political benefit when seeking reelection; (b) Congress is hesitant to engage in trial-like
proceeding which is foreign to its institutional design; and (c) desire of members of Congress to avoid
the appearance of interfering with the independence of the judiciary. Lynn A. Baker, Unnecessary and
Improper: the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J.
1117, 1139-40 (April 1985).
35. CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY 551 (110th Congress 2007-2008). The impeached judges in-
clude Samuel Chase, associate justice of the Supreme Court; acquitted March 1, 1805. John Pickering,
judge of the U.S. District Court for New Hampshire; removed from office March 12, 1804. James H.
Peck, judge of the U.S. District Court for Missouri; acquitted Jan. 31, 1831. West H. Humphreys, judge
of the U.S. District Court for the Middle, Eastern, and Western Districts of Tennessee; removed from
office June 26, 1862. Charles Swayne, judge of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Florida; acquitted Feb. 27, 1905. Robert W. Archbald, associate judge, U.S. Commerce Court; removed
Jan. 13, 1913. George W. English, judge of the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Illinois;
resigned Nov. 4, 1926; proceedings dismissed. Harold Louderback, judge of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California; acquitted May 24, 1933. Halsted L. Ritter, judge of the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida; removed from office April 17, 1936. Harry E. Clai-
borne, judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada; removed from office Oct. 9, 1986.
Alcee L. Hastings, judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida; removed from
office Oct. 20, 1988. Walter L. Nixon, judge of the U.S. District Court for Mississippi; removed from
office Nov. 3, 1989. Id. Recently, Samuel B. Kent, judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas was impeached on June 19, 2009 and subsequently resigned on June 30, 2009. See
Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/topics-ji
bdy (last visited July 5, 2009).
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (West 2007).
37. Prior to 1981, discipline of federal judges (other than impeachment) was "handled as part of
the general administrative responsibilities of the Judicial Councils of the various circuits under 28
U.S.C. § 332, which had been adopted in 1939." Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal
Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993).
38. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 291-308 (Dec. 1982). The representatives
of the judiciary were concerned not only about attempting to achieve accountability through the enact-
ment, but were also interested in addressing the administrative questions raised. For example, a dis-
abled judge who continued to be assigned cases but did not promptly dispose of the cases, placed an
administrative burden on the efficient administration of the courts. Thus, having a congressionally
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Congress a greater role in oversight of the disciplinary process and in as-
sessing and imposing of discipline.3 9
The disciplinary Act applies to all federal circuit, district, bankruptcy
or magistrate judges.40 It provides that "[a]ny" person who alleges that a
judge "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts" may file a written complaint
containing a statement of the facts of the alleged misconduct.4 1 The chief
judge of the circuit can also initiate an investigation by filing a written or-
der.4 2 Once the complaint is received, the clerk forwards a copy of the
complaint to the chief judge of the circuit, and also sends a copy to the
judge who is the subject of the complaint.43
After receiving the complaint, the chief judge has an obligation to con-
duct a "limited inquiry" to determine: (a) whether corrective action has
been or could be taken without a formal investigation; and (b) whether the
facts stated in the complaint are "plainly untrue or incapable of being es-
tablished through investigation.4 4 In conducting the limited inquiry, the
chief judge may request a response to the complaint from the judge named
in the complaint (although this response is not made available to the claim-
ant without authorization from the judge at issue). 45 The chief judge can
also speak to the claimant, or any other individual with knowledge, and
review any relevant documents.46
Once the chief judge has concluded this initial investigation, the chief
judge may dismiss the complaint if it:
(1) is not in the form required by statute;4 7
approved method for adjusting the workload of these judges (short of impeachment) was viewed posi-
tively by the judicial lobby. As with all compromises, the question of whether the ultimate outcome was
a good compromise is a matter of perspective. Since passage of the Act, a number of members of
Congress, agitated with the Act's perceived ineffectiveness, have proposed amendments and alterna-
tives. See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of Federal
Judges, 76 Ky. L. J. 643 (1988); Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 29, at 763 (1988).
39. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 291-308 (Dec. 1982). The representatives
of the judiciary were concerned not only about attempting to achieve accountability through the enact-
ment, but were also interested in addressing the administrative questions raised. For example, a dis-
abled judge who continued to be assigned cases but not promptly dispose of the cases, placed an
administrative burden on the efficient administration of the courts. Thus, having a congressionally
approved method for adjusting the workload of these judges (short of impeachment) was viewed posi-
tively by the judicial lobby. As with all compromises, the question of whether the ultimate outcome was
a good compromise is a matter of perspective. Since passage of the Act, a number of members of
Congress, agitated with the Act's perceived ineffectiveness, have proposed amendments and lterna-
tives. See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of Federal
Judges, 76 Ky. L. J. 643 (1988); Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 29, at 763 (1988).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 351(d)(1) (West 2007).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (West 2007).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 351(b) (West 2007).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 351(c) (West 2007).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1)-(2) (West 2007).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 352 (West 2007).
46. Id.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2007).
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(2) "directly relate[s] to the merits of a decision or procedu-
ral ruling;"48
(3) is "frivolous, lacking sufficient evidence to raise an in-
ference that misconduct has occurred;" or contained
facts that could not be established through an
investigation;49
(4) "lack[s] any factual foundation or are conclusively re-
futed by objective evidence;""o or
(5) if the chief judge "finds that appropriate corrective ac-
tion has been taken or that action on the complaint is
no longer necessary because of intervening events."5 1
If the complaint is dismissed, the judge at issue may request to be re-
imbursed for expenses (including attorneys' fees) from the Administrative
Office of Courts.52
The claimant or the judge named in the complaint has the right to
appeal the chief judge's decision to the judicial council of the circuit in
which the misconduct is alleged.5 3 The petition is then reviewed by a panel
of no fewer than five (5) members of the judicial council.54 There is no
further appeal or judicial review if the judicial council denies the petition
for review.
If, instead of dismissing the complaint, the chief judge determines after
the initial inquiry that the complaint should be investigated further, she
appoints a special committee composed of the chief judge and an equal
number of circuit and district court judges. 6 Thereafter, the committee
conducts an investigation and files a written report with the judicial council
including the committee's recommendations." The judicial council, once it
has received the report, may conduct an additional investigation, dismiss
the complaint, or take action "as is appropriate to assure the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the cir-
cuit."" After a decision by the council, the claimant or the judge at issue
has the right to petition the Judicial Conference for review.5 9 If the Judicial
48. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) (West 2007).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii) (West 2007).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(B) (West 2007).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(2) (West 2007).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 361 (West 2007).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 352(c) (West 2007).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 352(d) (West 2007). The committee must contain at least two (2) district judges
selected from the district where the alleged misconduct occurred. Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 352(c) (West 2007).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 353 (a)(1) (West 2007).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 352 (c) (West 2007).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2007).
59. 28 U.S.C. 357(a) (West 2007). The Judicial Conference is a national body. The Chief Justice
of the United States presides over the Conference. There are 26 members of the Conference other than
the Chief Justice including the chief judge of each court of appeals, one district court judge from each
regional circuit, and the chief judge of the Court of International Trade. The Conference appoints
committees to handle appeals of misconduct complaints.
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Conference denies a petition for review, the order is final and cannot be
appealed.o
If the judicial council determines that action should be taken, it has the
power to: (1) order that no further cases be assigned to the judge for a
temporary period of time; (2) order a private censure or reprimand; or (3)
order a public censure or reprimand. 1 If the judicial council determines
that an Article III judge has engaged in conduct that "might constitute one
or more grounds for impeachment" the council shall forward the complaint
to the Judicial Conference of the United States.6 2 If the Judicial Confer-
ence agrees that the judge's conduct constitutes an impeachable offense,
the Judicial Conference must forward the record to the House of Repre-
sentatives.6 All records of the investigation and findings are confidential
and are not to be disclosed.6 4 The judicial council has the discretion to
release a copy of a report of a special committee to the claimant and the
judge who is subject to the complaint and shall release any documents nec-
essary for an impeachment inquiry by Congress.65
III. BEGINNING AT THE BEGINNING: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MAINTAINING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
UNDER THE CURRENT SYSTEM
The procedures of the Act are designed to ensure both independence
and accountability - two critical and sometimes contradictory principals.6 6
The scholarship on whether the self-regulating system is effective at main-
taining the proper balance between independence and accountability is di-
vergent. Some argue that any discipline short of impeachment is an
"ominous threat to the judicial independence so necessary to our form of
government." 67  Proponents of this argument allege that any disciplinary
60. 28 U.S.C. § 357(c) (West 2007).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West 2007).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 354(b)(2)(A) (West 2007).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (West 2007).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 360(a) (West 2007).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)-(2) (West 2007). For a very helpful diagram of the procedural opera-
tion of the Act, see Edward D. Re, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Judicial Councils
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 8 N. Ky. L. REV. 221 app. (1981).
66. Dennis F. Thompson, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUP-
TION 19-24 (The Brookings Institute 1995).
67. Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L. J. 681, 682-83 (1979); see also
Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence ofJudicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980) ("A law that
stops short of providing for removal may be no less destructive of the constitutional scheme [than a
statute setting out a procedure for removal other than impeachment] if it destroys the capacity of fed-
eral courts to execute their fundamental responsibilities."). In the article, Professor Kaufman also
states: "While the constitutional text gives Congress the power to discipline its own members, the
judiciary is not similarly vested with disciplinary authority. The separation-of-powers framework con-
templates that the judiciary will hold its members accountable to the law and litigants through appellate
review, rather than inquisitorial proceedings. In essence, the Act forces judges to adopt a procedure for
reviewing their colleague's actions other than that established in the Constitution. Thus, the Act trans-
gresses the separation of powers unless it is narrowly drawn to further weighty and legitimate counter-
vailing interests." (footnotes omitted). See also Baker, supra note 34 (April 1985) (arguing that
providing judicial councils the right to restrict assignment of cases to federal judges deprives the judge
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procedures less than impeachment are unconstitutional6 8 and specifically
argue against certain aspects of the current Act - such as the ability to
withhold cases from a judge's calendar for an unlimited amount of time.69
This argument was clearly articulated by Justice Douglass in his dissent in
Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit:
An independent judiciary is one of this Nation's outstanding
characteristics. Once a federal judge is confirmed by the
Senate and takes his oath, he is independent of every other
judge. He commonly works with other federal judges who
are likewise sovereign. But neither one alone nor any num-
ber banded together can act as a censor and place sanctions
on him. Under the Constitution the only leverage that can
be asserted against him is impeachment, where pursuant to
a resolution passed by the House, he is tried by the Senate,
sitting as a jury . . . Our tradition even bars political im-
peachments as evidenced by the highly partisan, but unsuc-
cessful, effort to oust Justice Samuel Chase of this Court in
1805. The Impeachment Provision of the Constitution in-
deed provides for the removal of "Officers of the United
States,' which includes judges, on 'Impeachment for, and
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.' Art. II, s. 4 .... What the Judicial Council
did when it ordered petitioner to 'take no action whatsoever
in any case or proceeding now or hereafter pending' in his
court was to do what only the Court of Impeachment can
do.70
On the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that the best method
to ensure true judicial accountability is to hold judges accountable through
the political process.7 1 For example, proposed periodic evaluation of judi-
cial performance by congressional committees.72
Between these two extremes are those who argue in favor of some
version of a self-regulatory system. Those promoting self-regulation argue
of her constitutional right to "hold[ ] office" and equates to an improper removal of the judge from
office).
68. Baker, supra note 34 (concluding that the Act's standard for misconduct, "'prejudicial to the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts' all too readily becomes a license
for disgruntled litigants and fellow judges to harass the judicial maverick.").
69. McCalla, supra note 28 (arguing that while sanctions less than impeachment are not unconsti-
tutional, allowing the judicial council to suspend a judge from receiving new cases for an unlimited
amount of time is the equivalent of impeachment and therefore unconstitutional).
70. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 136 (1970)
(Douglass, J., dissenting).
71. Howard T. Markey, The Delicate Dichotomies of Judicial Ethics, 101 F.R.D. 373, 375-77
(1984).
72. See S. 3018, 97th Cong. (1982). Bill 3018 sought to create a joint committee of Congress to
evaluate performance of all federal judges every ten years to determine whether a judge's conduct met
the constitutional standard of "good behavior."
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that judicial "misconduct" in the large majority of cases is actually in-
stances of Judges being unaware (or being unwilling to admit) their own
short-comings." Therefore relying on internal procedures-such as com-
munication with the judge and making suggestions for corrections-is the
preferred method to remedy judicial misconduct.7 4 According to this ap-
proach, the primary purpose of the Act is not to punish wayward judges,
but to allow chief judges in the circuits to informally correct deviant behav-
ior." In addition, self-regulation allows the judiciary to keep its own
house-without interference from the other branches. Because fellow
judges are better able to determine what conduct "crosses the line" and
what conduct, although unpopular, is inherent in the process of judging,
they are able to maintain the independence of the judiciary while at the
same time addressing deviance by federal judges. In addition, proponents
point out that self-regulation also benefits Congress if an impeachment in-
quiry becomes necessary by providing the House of Representatives with
an "expert witness" to gather evidence and evaluate the judge's conduct
prior to consideration by the House of Representatives.76
Even after adoption of the current system for addressing judicial mis-
conduct was adopted in 1980, skepticism of the judiciary's ability to self-
regulate is a recurring issue. In 1990, Congress authorized the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal to investigate problems
related to the discipline of Article III judges and propose alternatives to
self-regulation under the Act." While the Commission concluded that eve-
rything was "rosy" under the self-regulation procedures set out in the Act,
it did recognize that, at times, considerations of complaints were less than
ideal:
This study has demonstrated that most of the complaints are meritless.
As to others, it appears that they have usually been properly handled.
There have been a number of instances of discipline under the Act, and
many more in which the Act has led or contributed to administrative im-
provements and other corrective actions. All these factors paint a rosy
picture.
73. Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Building a Better Bench, 1 JUDGEs' J. 16, 17-18 (2005).
74. Id. at 18-19. Fitzpatrick also states that administering anonymous surveys of lawyers who
practice before the judge can serve to both inform the judge of problems and allows for corrective
action within the current self-regulating framework. Id.
75. Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation, Accountability, and
Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
25, 93-94 (Nov. 1993). In discussing informal methods of judicial discipline, Professor Geyh found that
even with regard to complaints that did not involve misconduct as defined by the Act, the information
in the complaint provides chief judges an opportunity to informally address the conduct with a judge
even if the conduct falls below what would be considered "misconduct" under the Act. Charles G.
Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 249 (Nov. 1993).
76. Elbert P. Tuttle, Preserving Judicial Integrity: Some Comments on the Role of the Judiciary
Under the "Blending" of Powers, 37 EMORY L.J. 587. 610-11 (Summer 1988).
77. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 122 (1993).
78. Marcus, supra note 37, at 434.
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The Commission did acknowledge areas that needed improvement,
namely: (1) in "some possibly serious cases" the response was "less vigor-
ous than it should have been;"7 9 and (2) significant differences between the
circuits in implementation of the Act.so
Thereafter, in 2004, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist recog-
nized that there was "some recent criticism from Congress about the way
the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is being implemented," and
commissioned a committee to evaluate how the Act was being imple-
mented." The committee's report, completed two years after it was com-
missioned (and after Chief Justice Rehnquist's death), concluded that there
were "no serious problem[s] with the judiciary's handling of the vast bulk
of complaints under the Act." 82 The committee recommended twelve sug-
gestions for improving implementation of the Act, but no changes to the
statute itself or the self-regulation scheme.
Based on the foregoing, the current judicial misconduct procedure,
which has been in place for more than twenty-five years, is either a glowing
success or a shameful failure." From the perspective of the judiciary, the
Act is operating properly and needs only procedural tweaks (but no
changes to the Act itself).84 From the perspective of critics, the Act is in-
consistently applied and should be reformed to ensure reliable handling of
complaints. Recently, Representative J. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis) and
Senator Charles Grassley (R-lowa) have proposed bills in the House and
Senate, respectively, that would over-haul the misconduct statutes and cre-
ate an office of Inspector General to review judicial misconduct complaints
that are denied by the chief judge or judicial council."
The purpose of this article is not to weigh in on the constitutional de-
bate over the propriety of discipline less than impeachment. It also does
not recommend a complete overhaul of the current system. Instead, this
article's goal is both more limited and more pragmatic. It analyzes the role
of the chief judge in the initial evaluation of judicial misconduct complaints
and recommends that the initial complaints go to a magistrate who is
charged with receiving, evaluating, and investigating complaints and rec-
ommending action to the chief judge. Modifying the system in this manner
avoids the constitutional challenges that other proposals invite, and it also
supplements and does not supplant the current system.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMMITTEE, THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEP JUSTICE 1 (Sept.
2006).
82. Id. at 5.
83. Burbank, supra note 38 (evaluating Rules implemented by judicial councils two years after
Act's passage and concluding that the rules were "deficient").
84. THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMMITrEE, THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 5 (Sept.
2006).
85. H.R. 785, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Before moving into issues related to the current system and proposals
for reform, perhaps it is worthwhile to consider how complaints have been
handled under the Act. The following table shows how complaints have
been handled over the last ten years."
9/30/99 9/30/00 9/30/01 9/30/02 9/30/03 9/30/04 9/30/05 9/30/06
to to to to to to to to
9/30/00 9/30/01 9/30/02 9/30/03 9/30/04 9/30/05 9/30/06 9/30/07
Total Complaints
Resolved: 715 668 780 682 784 667 619 752
Action Taken By Chief Judge Upon Receipt of Complaint
Complaints Dismissed:
- Not in Conformity
with Statute 29 13 27 39 27 21 25 18
- Directly Related to
Decision or Procedural
Ruling 264 235 249 230 295 319 283 318
- Frivolous 50 103 110 77 112 41 63 56
- Appropriate Action
already taken 6 4 3 3 3 5 5 3
- Action No Longer
Necessary Because of
Intervening Events 7 5 6 8 9 8 6 6
- Complaint Withdrawn 3 3 8 8 3 6 9 3
TOTAL: 359 363 403 365 449 400 391 404
Action Taken by Judicial Council - After Referral by Chief Judge:
Directed Chief Judge to
take Action (Magistrate
only) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Publicly Censured 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
Ordered Other
Appropriate Action 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Dismissed the Complaint 354 303 375 316 335 267 227 344
Withdrawn 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
TOTAL: 356 305 377 317 335 267 228 346
Considering the judicial discipline complaints set out in the table
above, two facts become clear. First, an extraordinary percentage of com-
plaints dismissed by the chief judge are dismissed as either directly related
to the merits of the case (70%) or frivolous (19%). Overall, dismissals on
these grounds account for 89% of dismissals by the chief judge. Second, it
is extremely unlikely there will be any action taken on complaints referred
to the circuit's judicial council by the chief judge. Over the ten year period
analyzed, an astounding 99.6% of complaints were dismissed by councils,
86. Data for chart taken from ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
US COURTS, TABLES S-22A AND S-22B, REPORT OF COMPLAINTS FILED AND ACTION TAKEN UNDER
AUTHORITY OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 for the dates listed.
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while only .4% received further action (where a public censure, the com-
plaint was withdraw or other action). These statistics demonstrate the im-
portance of the initial review and determination in the process. If the
initial review and investigation are not adequate, the likelihood of further
investigation by the judicial council is almost non-existent.
A. The Current System Is Too Subjective and Ambiguous
The first major concern with regard to the current system is that the
statutory definition of misconduct is too subjective and ambiguous." The
Act states that a judge may be disciplined if she has "engaged" in "conduct
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts."" The meaning of this phrase is laced with ambiguity, re-
quiring a complainant (who is often a non-lawyer) to communicate the al-
leged misconduct in a manner that fits within the statutory definition, while
not verbalizing conduct (such as relating to the merits of the claim) which
will result in a summary dismissal of the complaint without investigation.8 9
To make matters worse, courts are inconsistent in delineating the scope of
the Act's reach. For example, assume a judge takes an excessive amount of
time to rule on a matter in a particular case and a complaint is filed. De-
pending on how the chief judge receiving the complaint views the allega-
tion, she might: (1) dismiss the complaint because the lack of action by the
judge is not the equivalent of "engag[ing]" in conduct under the Act (fail-
ure to act is not engaging in conduct); (2) dismiss the complaint because the
delay in a singular case-even if the delay is termed excessive-does not
rise to the level of "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts"; (3) dismiss the complaint be-
cause the complaint relates to the merits of the case-and the proper rem-
edy is through the appellate process or through a writ of mandamus 90; or
(4) consider the complaint valid under the Act.9'
The ambiguity of defining misconduct results in skepticism surround-
ing the integrity of the initial review of the complaint. To make matters
worse, complaints dismissed by the chief judge have no precedential value.
87. Ambiguity is found not only in the language of the Act itself, but also in the legislative
history of the Act, which makes the precise scope of the Act's reach unclear. See Peter R. Ryan,
Counsels, Councils and Lunch: Preventing Abuse of the Power to Appoint Independent Counsels, 144
U. PA. L. REv. 2537, 2562-65 (June 1986).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (West 2007).
89. See supra notes 34-38.
90. In fact, as Professor Geyh points out, this approach to a disciplinary complaint can have the
consequence of making the most egregious misconduct fall outside the Act:
The operating assumption of this approach is that the Act serves a gap-filling function, in
which its availability is limited to situations in which appeal or mandamus is unavailable.
Given that appeal or mandamus is available when delays turn outrageous and when court-
room misconduct becomes so extreme as to deprive litigants of fundamental due process, the
paradox of this approach is that the severity of the judicial misconduct becomes inversely
related to the applicability of the Act. That is, the more outrageous the delay or the more
extreme the courtroom misconduct, the more available becomes appeal or mandamus, and the
less available becomes discipline. Geyh, supra note 74, at 255-56.
91. Id. at 243, 248-54.
[VOL. 28:381394
2009] THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980 395
This creates an environment in which the chief judge's actions are shrouded
in mystery and largely based on the chief judge's own interpretation of
what misconduct warrants further investigation on an ad hoc basis. Be-
cause of this ambiguity in language and uncertainty in interpretation, there
is a concern that the chief judge, after reviewing a complaint against a col-
league (particularly one in-artfully drafted by a non-lawyer), will resolve
any ambiguity in favor of the judge and dismiss the complaint. Further-
more, there is a risk that any investigation that is ultimately undertaken is
with the goal of clearing the judge, as opposed to objectively considering
the facts.
Whether this concern is supported by the data of actual complaints
depends on one's perspective. As the table above demonstrates, between
September 30, 1999, and September 30, 2007, the chief judge dismissed
complaints filed in their circuit-without referring the matter to the judicial
council-55% of the time. Proponents of the current system will point
out that it is undisputed that a large number of complaints filed under the
Act do not rise to the level of misconduct, and dismissal of only 55% dem-
onstrates the chief judge's deference to judicial council in border-line cases.
However, it is not at all clear the nature of the cases dismissed initially and
those cases investigated or referred to the judicial council. It is the uncer-
tainty that surrounds the chief judge's initial decision-making process that
raises questions regarding the integrity of the disciplinary system.
This shortcoming of the current system is not attributable to malicious-
ness or malfeasance on the part of the chief judge. The concerns raised
here are inherent in the system itself - which may result in unconscious
denials of valid complaints or, at the very least, the appearance that valid
complaints are being dismissed or that a chief judge is turning a blind-eye
to on-going misconduct. Take for example the case of Judge John Mc-
Bryde, which has been described as the most "significant application" of
the Judicial Misconduct Act." A special committee of the Judicial Council
of the Fifth Circuit held hearings over a nine day period regarding the con-
duct of Judge McBryde. The committee concluded:
When viewed in isolation, the incidents described above run
the gamut from outrageous to inappropriate. When viewed
together, the incidents bespeak several alarming patterns of
conduct exhibited by Judge McBryde over the course of his
92. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF US COURTS, TABLES S-
22A AND S-22B, REPORT OF COMPLAINTS FILED AND ACTION TAKEN UNDER AUTHORITY OF 28 U.S.C.
§§ 351-364. In fact, the percentage of complaints dismissed by the chief judge without referring the
matter to the judicial council has remained fairly constant over time. The highest percentage of com-
plaints dismissed by the chief judge was in 2005-2006, where the chief judge dismissed 63.1% of the
complaints. The lowest percentage of complaints dismissed by the chief judge was in 1999-2000, where
50% of the complaints were dismissed by the chief judge [the range for these statistics is from 1999-
2007]. Id.
93. McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.D.C. 1999), reversed by 264 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir.
2001), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 99 (2002).
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tenure on the bench." . . . These patterns fall into five catego-
ries: "Proclivity to Question Integrity," . . ., "Overreactions
and Abusive Sanctions,". . ., "Obsessive Need to Con-
trol," . . ., "Inappropriate Conduct Toward Fellow
Judges," . . . . . .,and "Effect on the Legal Community."94
Reading the facts of Judge McBryde's conduct, no one would deny
that the conduct is both extreme and unusual. However, even in this ex-
treme case, note Judge McBryde's "outrageous" and "inappropriate" con-
duct had occurred "over the course of his tenure on the bench"-or since
1990. Even more disturbing is that the investigation into McBryde's ac-
tions was initiated by a "Request for Assistance in Resolution of Dispute"
filed by Judge McBryde himself after the chief judge in his district trans-
ferred two cases from McBryde. 95 Furthermore, when McBryde informed
the chief judge that he would file a "Request for Assistance," the chief
judge responded "that if he sought the assistance of the Judicial Council in
resolving the legal issue at the heart of this dispute, his entire career as a
judge would be explored." 96
The case of Judge McBryde raises concerns about the ability of the
current misconduct system to handle what may be called "piecemeal mis-
conduct." Piecemeal misconduct occurs when the judge's actions, if consid-
ered in the larger context (either through prior complaints or evidence that
arose in an investigation), would violate the Act, but when viewed through
the prism of an individual complaint the conduct does not rise to conduct
"prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts . . ."' When this type of piecemeal misconduct occurs, indi-
vidual actions of misconduct may be dismissed and/or handled informally.
If the judge fails to reform her actions, misconduct continues to reoccur
until the conduct can no longer be kept private and the remedies informal.
Once the misconduct becomes public, critics begin to ask, "how was this
conduct allowed to go on so long when other judges knew it was occur-
ring?" The risk of this type of piecemeal conduct should be recognized as a
recurring problem and formally addressed at the initial review process.
Without a modification to the current system to ensure that the initial re-
view system includes a method for identifying and imposing formal sanc-
tions to remedy piecemeal misconduct, the appearance of impropriety in
the system will remain, and congressional questioning of the process itself
will continue.98
94. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
95. In re McBryde, 117 F.3d 208, 217 (5th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 1185 S. Ct. 2340 (1998).
96. McBryde, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 141.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 351(c) (Westlaw 2007).
98. Of course the concept of the "appearance of impropriety" is one that permeates judicial
ethics. Canon 1 of the ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucr states: "A judge shall uphold and
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANON 1 (1990). To determine
whether conduct creates the "appearance of impropriety," the Model Code states the test is whether
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B. The "guild mentality" as a Limitation on Equitable Enforcement of
the Misconduct Statutes
The case of Judge McBryde also provides an example of how self-regu-
lation can promote a "guild mentality" among the judiciary.9 9 The chief
judge in the McBryde case had knowledge of prior misconduct by Mc-
Bryde, but no formal investigation was commenced until McBryde himself
initiated what turned out to be his own misconduct investigation. Judges
are no different than members of other professions, and
any charge that a fellow professional is guilty of malpractice
is a prima facie invitation to other professionals to retreat to
a guild mentality, denying that the infraction took place.
The impetus to cover up is not primarily due to friendship
toward the accused but rather to a general perception that
disclosure would lead to public disrespect of the profession
as a whole. 100
In fact, in the recent report on the implementation of the Judicial Mis-
conduct Act, Justice Breyer, writing for the committee, acknowledged the
potential for such a problem: "[A] system that relies for investigation solely
upon judges themselves risks a kind of undue 'guild favoritism' through
inappropriate sympathy with the judge's point of view or de-emphasis of
the misconduct problem."'o
Dennis Thompson found that the same issues arise in the legislative
context when members of Congress seek to discipline their own:
The obligations, loyalties, and civilities that are necessary,
even admirable. . .make it difficult to judge colleagues ob-
jectively or to act on judgments even when objectively
made. Furthermore, the less that a charge seems to resem-
ble individual corruption [or misconduct], the harder it is for
colleagues to come to a severe judgment even if it is war-
ranted. The member implicated . . . showing no obvious
signs of a guilty mind or unusually selfish motives, is seen as
simply doing what the job requires or at least permits.
Under such circumstances the sympathy of colleagues is
"the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated this Code or en-
gaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or
fitness to serve as a judge." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT CANON 2 cmt. 2. While the Act does not
adopt an "appearance of impropriety" standard, this seems to be precisely what critics of the Act argue.
The judiciary, in disciplining its own, creates in the minds of reasonable persons a perception that those
involved in the process are not acting impartially.
99. See Marcus, supra note 37, at 391 (describing this as the "cover up" concern but finding that
there was "no basis at present to conclude that there is a significant amount of coverup" in the system).
100. Anthony D'Amato, Self-Regulation of Judicial Misconduct Could be Mis-Regulation, 89
MICH. L. REV. 609, 609 (Dec. 1990).
101. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 1 (Sept. 2006).
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maximized and their capacity for objectivity minimized.
The circumstances are not favorable for the principle of in-
dependence, which calls for judgment on the merits.1 0 2
In the judicial misconduct context, the "guild mentality" has the effect
of creating a bias against claimants and a presumption that complaints are
not well-founded.10 3
The result of this guild mentality in the specific context of the judiciary
is a desire to look inward when addressing a misconduct complaint. This
means utilizing informal methods of addressing a complaint as opposed to
the formal procedures and remedies set out in the Act. Such informal ef-
forts certainly may be effective, and interviews with chief judges have
demonstrated that the judges have not been hesitant to use informal chan-
nels to address misconduct.10 4 In fact, Professor Geyh identified three pri-
mary arguments in favor of informal contact: (1) judges are dedicated to
their work and the judiciary and bringing any misconduct to their attention
is enough to cause a correction; (2) judges may react more positively to a
"friendly" admonishment or suggestion than from an official complaint and
investigation; and (3) the formal complaint process provides a "gun behind
the door" and bolsters the likelihood that informal discussions will be ef-
fective.10 Informal resolution of complaints however also raises two sig-
nificant problems. The first is that informal sanctions undermine a
fundamental purpose of the Act - to bring a sense of accountability to the
judicial disciplinary process. Informal contact fails to provide this public
oversight and fails to demonstrate to the public that the judiciary is willing
to self-police misconduct. 1 0 6 Second, the growth of the federal judiciary
decreases the likelihood that informal communications, and the judge's de-
sire to remain in good standing with other judges, can shame a judge into
changing her ways.' 0
102. Thompson, supra note 65, at 132-33.
103. D'Amato, supra note 99, at 610.
104. Geyh, supra note 74, at 282-83.
105. Id.; Marcus, supra note 37, at 389 ("[Olur survey of present and former circuit chief judges
indicates that they believe the Act encourages judges to respond constructively to informal efforts by
chief judges to remedy misconduct or disability. From the stick perspective, it seems that the existence
of the Act is a valuable prod for chief judges who want other judges to take their concerns seriously.").
106. The use of discipline or sanction to uphold the image of the bench in the eyes of the public is
commonly cited purpose of lawyer discipline, and there is no reason the same is not true for discipline
of judges. See Eric Steele & Raymond Nimmer, Clients and Professional Regulation, 1976 A.B.F. REs.
J. 917, 999-1014 (1976) (identifying the functions of disciplinary process as "(1) to identify and remove
from the profession all seriously deviant members (the 'cleansing' function), (2) to deter normative
deviance and maximize compliance with norms among attorneys (the deterrence function), and (3) to
maintain a level of response to deviance sufficient to forestall public dissatisfaction (the public image
function).").
107. Geyh, supra note 74, at 40-42 ("The rapidly increasing size of the federal judiciary in recent
years has, in the minds of many judges, precipitated a decline in collegiality. Twenty-five of twenty-nine
chief judges responding to the survey agreed. The possibility thus exists that a decline in collegiality
may precipitate a decline in the significance of peer influence as a disciplinary mechanism. A plurality
of eleven chief circuit judges believed that the decline in collegiality has reduced the impact of peer
influence on judicial behavior, while nine saw no effect, and two correlated the decline in collegiality to
an increase in the influence of peer pressure."). .
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A corollary to the "guild mentality" is the natural tendency to view the
alleged misconduct through the prism of the norms of the judicial institu-
tion (regardless whether the actions constitute misconduct). In other
words, the reviewing judge will naturally ask herself whether the actions
are different from how other judges (including herself) ordinarily act. The
result is that the chief judge, in reviewing a complaint, may choose to dis-
miss the complaint rather than do additional follow up because investigat-
ing the complaint could require the judge to question actions which a
disinterested outsider may consider misconduct but which are so prevalent
and accepted in the institution that the judge is resistant to challenging
them."os Certainly this is an inherent risk in any self-regulating system;
however, the goal is to minimize the insular nature of the review to the
extent possible. Finally, from an institutional perspective, a judge may only
serve as chief judge for seven years, and the position of chief judge is deter-
mined by seniority.109 Thus, the current chief judge, aware of her limited
term and that a colleague will soon be in the position, may be less inclined
to investigate or take action out of fear of reprisal when her term
expires.110
A final observation is pragmatic in nature. The current disciplinary
procedure places the entire burden on evaluating and initially investigating
complaints on the chief judge. While the opinions of chief judges vary with
regard to the nature of the burden,' the increasing workload of federal
judges since the current system was enacted' 12 raises concerns about the
ability of chief judges to devote sufficient attention to misconduct com-
plaints.1 13 In fact, the committee appointed to evaluate implementation of
the Act found that some chief judges routinely have staff review the com-
plaint and prepare draft orders of dismissal for complaints received.11 4
C. Lawyers and Court Personnel Will Be Hesitant to Make Legitimate
Complaints Under the Current System
Concerns about the procedures under the current Act are not limited
to conduct by the chief judge after receipt of the complaint. There is also a
concern that those with the most legitimate complaints will be hesitant to
come forward.1 15 Professor Geyh breaks down potential complainants into
108. Thompson, supra note 65, at 133.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) and 45(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2009).
110. 28 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A) (Westlaw 2009); see also, Fitzpatrick, supra note 72, at 19-20.
111. Barr & Willging, supra note 74, at 40-42.
112. See Chief Justice John Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf).
113. Marcus, supra note 37, at 397 ("Discipline is an additional chore for busy judges. Under
§ 372(c), much of that burden is imposed on the circuit chief judge, who is likely to be among the
busiest of judges. Accordingly one cannot minimize the importance of this judicial burden.").
114. THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT STUDY COMM., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ACT OF 1980: A REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 31 (2006).
115. Even those defending the current system of informal discipline acknowledge that such con-
cerns are "widespread." Fitzpatrick, supra note 72, at 19 ("A widespread fear exists within the bar,
unjustified in my view, that retailiation against lawyers, their firms, or their clients may occur if they are
critical of a court or its members, so bar members are very reluctant to criticize.").
399
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
two categories: "outsiders" (consisting of lawyers, litigants, jurors, wit-
nesses, observers) and "insiders" (fellow judges, clerks, and other court
personnel). 1 Outsiders, such as lawyers, may be hesitant to file a com-
plaint against a judge for fear of retaliation by the judge against the law-
yer's current or future clients."' In the case of Judge McBryde, discussed
above, examples of conduct toward attorneys included:
(1) Attorney held in contempt of court when, due to a mal-
functioning of the telephone system, the attorney's of-
fice was unable to initiate a prompt conference call with
the Court and opposing counsel. Terrified of Judge Mc-
Bryde after this incident, and fearful about testifying
before the Committee, the attorney accepted a tempo-
rary transfer to another district following his appear-
ance as a witness in the Special Committee hearings. 1 s
(2) Criminal defense attorney declined to answer a ques-
tion which Judge McBryde posed because he believed
that his response would waive his client's privilege to his
client's detriment. Judge McBryde refused to recess the
proceeding to allow the attorney an opportunity to con-
sult with his client or to research the issue before re-
sponding to Judge McBryde. Instead, Judge McBryde
ordered in open court that the attorney be incarcerated
until he agreed to answer the question, holding the at-
torney in civil contempt of court for not responding to
his question.119
(3) Attorney received a call from chambers at 4:50 p.m. to
inform him that, in response to his motion to continue a
sentencing, the court had scheduled a hearing for 9:00
a.m. the following morning, and would require the phy-
sician to testify live at the hearing as to his client's medi-
cal condition necessitating continuance of the
sentencing. The attorney was able only to arrange for
the physician to participate in a telephone conference
call before the physician left town. Judge McBryde first
ordered the attorney ejected from the courtroom, and
later, upon permitting him to reenter, questioned the at-
torney in a belittling fashion about his knowledge of the
use of subpoenas.1 2 0
116. Geyh, supra note 74, at 257.
117. Professor Geyh quotes chief judges as saying the following: (1) "Lawyers are reluctant to file
complaints and will do it only in a serious case"; and (2) "It's very difficult for a practicing lawyer to file
a complaint, they're in constant practice before the judge. Yet those are the complaints that tend to
require some action or caution on my part." Id.
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These examples raise a glaring question: why did these attorneys-
humiliated by Judge McBryde in open court-not report these clear exam-
ples of misconduct? The fact is that attorneys are repeat players before
judges. Judges make rulings which directly affect their clients and the out-
come of cases. An attorney is unlikely to report that a judge has engaged
in misconduct when lawyer believes (whether validly or not) that reporting
the misconduct could have significant negative impact on himself or his
client in the future. Ironically, the more egregious the judge's conduct, the
more likely the judge would seek revenge, and the less likely that an attor-
ney will report the misconduct.121 The Act does not provide as a potential
reassignment of cases involving lawyers making legitimate complaints
against a judge. The same hesitation exists for those "insiders" who may
see repeated misconduct by the judge, but fail to take any action. These
individuals run the risk of retaliation in the work-place-where they will
encounter the judge on a day-to-day basis.
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the claimant must sign the
complaint alleging misconduct under oath. The Rules for Judicial-Conduct
and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, adopted by the Judicial Conference of
the United States, provides:
6(d)Complainant's Address and Signature; Verification.
The complainant must provide a contact address and sign
the complaint. The truth of the statements made in the com-
plaint must be verified in writing under penalty of perjury.
If any of these requirements are not met, the complaint will
be accepted for filing, but it will be reviewed under only
Rule 5(b).12 2
The requirement of the claimant's name and address on the complaint,
which is then sent to the judge, is a particularly strong deterrent for
lawyers.
IV. REEVALUATING THE MISCONDUCT PROCEDURES:
THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INSPECTOR GENERAL
High-profile cases such as those of Judges Real and McBryde have
resulted in legislative proposals to overhaul the disciplinary system. The
most recent proposal is to establish an office of Inspector General for the
judiciary (inspector generals currently exist in the executive and legislative
branches). The Inspector General would be responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the Act, particularly those complaints which are dis-
missed without investigation. In January 2007, Representative Sensenbren-
ner (R-WI) introduced the Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement
121. These consequences are even more dire for court staff. The staff relies on the court for their
livelihood. If a staff member files a complaint helshe runs the real (or legitimately perceived) risk of
facing serious consequences.
122. RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILTY PROCEEDINGs 6.
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Act of 2007 (H.R. 785-110th Congress 1st Session) to create an office of
Inspector General for the judicial branch.12 3 Representative Sensenbren-
ner, in a statement regarding the proposed bill, opined that the current self-
policing statutes are not "up to snuff" and that the Inspector General
would "root out waste, fraud, and abuse and ensure. . .taxpayer-funded
resources are utilized in an appropriate manner. ... Senator Grassley
supported Representative Sensenbrenner's assessment: "[An] inspector
general is just the right kind of medicine that the Federal judiciary needs to
ensure that it is complying with every ethics rule."125 There are currently
approximately 60 inspector generals throughout the government.126
Looking at the procedure of the Sensenbrenner bill, an Inspector Gen-
eral would be appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, "after
consultation with the majority and minority leaders of the Senate and the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives."1 27 The In-
spector General would serve for four years and would be subject to reap-
pointment and removal by the Chief Justice.128 Thus, the bill gives the
Chief Justice a great deal of authority in hiring and firing the judicial in-
spector general. However, if the Chief Justice removes an Inspector Gen-
eral, he/she must communicate the reasons for removal to both Houses of
Congress.129 The Inspector General's office would commence an investiga-
tion on a complaint alleging judicial misconduct only after a denial of a
petition for review by the circuit judicial council or upon referral or certifi-
cation of a complaint to the Inspector General.130 However, the Inspector
General is expressly precluded from investigating "any matter that is di-
rectly related to the merits of a decision or procedural rule" by the judge
and is prohibited from disciplining any judge.131 This provision is meant to
ensure the independence of the judiciary.
Once the Inspector General's powers are triggered, she would have
the express authority to "make investigations and reports," obtaining infor-
mation from Federal, State, or local governmental agencies.132 The Inspec-
tor General would also have subpoena power to compel the testimony of
123. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 785, 110th Congress § 1021
(1st Sess. 2007). This is not the first time a bill has been introduced proposing an inspector general for
issues relating to the judicial branch - including oversight of judicial discipline. See Diane M. Hartmus,
Inspection and Oversight in the Federal Courts: Creating an Office of Inspector General, 35 CAL. W.L.
REv. 243 (Spring 1999).
124. Bruce Moyer, Inspector General Bills Rile Judiciary, 53 JUN FED. LAw. 10, 10 (June 2006).
125. Id.
126. Hearing on the Jud. Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006 before the Comm. on
the Jud. H.R., Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (statement
of Rep. Coble: "There are too many questions about how conflicts and financial interests are reported
and how recusal lists are compiled and kept up to date.").
127. H.R. 785, 105th Cong. § 1022(a) (1997).
128. H.R. 785, § 1022(b).
129. H.R. 785, § 1022(c).
130. H.R. 785, § 1023(b).
131. H.R. 785, § 1024(c)(1)-(2).
132. H.R. 785, § 1024(a)(2) ,(5)-(7) (expressly provides that the Inspector General would have the
power to obtain information from the Judicial Conference of the United States, the judicial councils of
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witnesses and production of "books, records, correspondence memoranda,
papers, and documents."' 3 3 This would include the right to obtain affida-
vits and other affirmations.134
The Inspector General would make an annual report setting out the
activities of the Inspector General's office to the Chief Justice and Con-
gress.135 The Inspector General must also "report expeditiously" to the
Attorney General when the Inspector General has "reasonable grounds"
to believe there has been a violation of federal criminal law.13 6 The bill
provides protection for "whistleblowers." No "officer, employee, agent,
contractor or subcontractor" in the judicial branch "may discharge, de-
mote, threaten, suspend, harass or in any other manner discriminate" any
employee who assists the Inspector General in carrying out his/her du-
ties. 137 The Act provides for a civil cause of action for retaliating against
whistleblowers.138
Members of Congress opposed to the creation of an inspector general
position argued that the purpose of the bill was to provide "a means of
intimidating judges into political compliance."' 3 9 In addition, the judiciary
greeted the proposal of an Inspector General as a direct attack on judicial
independence. Associate Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
sounded the alarm when she described the Inspector General bill: "[i]t
sounds to me very much like the Soviet Union was . . . . That's a really
scary idea."14 0
Opponents of the Sensenbrenner-Grassley proposal have legitimate
concerns. The bill as written gives the Inspector General, vague, and puz-
zling powers. For example, the bill gives the Inspector General the author-
ity to "prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse."14 ' The statute does not
set out precisely what "waste, fraud, and abuse" the Inspector General is
charged with-is he charged with not only detecting but also preventing
(presumably with the power to take preemptive action)? The drafters of
the bill argue that these powers are fiscal and relate to wasteful spending
by the judiciary. As Senator Grassley stated, "I rely on I.G.s and
circuits, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and the United States Sentencing
Commission).
133. H.R. 785, § 1024(a)(3).
134. H.R. 785, § 1024(a)(4).
135. H.R. 785, § 1025(a)(1).
136. H.R. 785, § 1025(c).
137. H.R. 785, § 1026(a).
138. H.R. 785, § 1026(b).
139. Hearing on the Jud. Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006 before the Comm. on
the Jud. H.R., Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement
of Rep. Conyers). In a hearing on the Inspector General bill before the House Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Senator Grassley made it clear what conduct he believed
needed to be "snuffed" out-judges' ruling in cases in which they have a conflicts of interest and
judges' failure to disclose financial holdings. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Grassley: "There are too many
questions about how conflicts and financial interests are reported and how recusal lists are compiled
and kept up to date.").
140. Moyer, supra note 124, at 10.
141. H.R. 785, § 1023(3).
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whistleblowers to ensure that our tax dollars are spent according to the
letter and spirit of the law."1 42 Even if it is understood that the Inspector
General is intended to operate as a "waste watchdog," this limitation is not
set out in the bill and appears to undermine the very purpose of the bill-
reviewing complaints of judicial misconduct. The investigative powers of
the Inspector General are not triggered until after a "denial of a petition
for review by the circuit judicial council or upon referral or certification of
a complaint to the Inspector General."143
The role of the Inspector General does not seem to be limited to en-
suring that claims of judicial misconduct are properly investigated. How-
ever, this is precisely what the proponents of the bill advertised:
Under the proposed legislation, judges will be able to re-
spond that the Inspector General has investigated and
found the complaints to be fruitless. And if the complaint is
valid? Then the judges will know that there is a problem,
and that it needs correcting. The proposed Inspector Gen-
eral, "will not have any authority or jurisdiction over the
substance of a judge's opinions. The proposed law would
not interfere with judges' independence to write their
opinions.144
Unfortunately, the bill is not written "as advertised." As written, a
denial of a petition for review releases the Inspector General to audit the
judge subject to the complaint-searching for elusive "waste, fraud, or
abuse."
To put it simply, the Sensenbrenner-Grassley proposal is a bad idea.
Not only is it likely unconstitutional,145 it also fails to address the primary
concerns of those who are skeptical of the procedures under the current
Act. The underlying concern is that valid complaints are being dismissed
and not investigated. The Inspector General approach simply adds a new
level of vague and uncertain review-adding not only cost to the review
and the time necessary to complete the review of a complaint, but also
142. Hearing on the Jud. Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006 before the Comm. on
the Jud. H.R., Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement
of Sen. Grassley); Sensenbrenner, Grassley Introduce Legislation Establishing an Inspector General for
the Judicial Branch, NEws ADVISORY (U.S. H.R. Comm. On the Jud., Washington, D.C.), April 27, 2006
("[A]n IG will serve as a public watchdog to root out waste, fraud, and abuse and ensure the Third
Branch's taxpayer-funded resources are utilized in an appropriate manner ... .").
143. H.R. 785, § 1023(b).
144. Hearing on the Jud. Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2006 before the Comm. on
the Jud. H.R., Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security 19 109th Cong. (2006) (prepared
statement of Rotunda).
145. Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges Cannot
Always be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 Ky. L. J. 439, 446-47
(2009).
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adding the concern that the Inspector General will use her position as a
method of intimidating a judge for a particular decision. 146
V. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM: UTILIZING A MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO
RECEIVE AND REVIEW MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS
The Sensenbrenner bill and the continuing congressional concern over
the disciplinary process demonstrates discontent with the process for evalu-
ating complaints of judicial misconduct. However, a disruption to the self-
regulating nature of the current system is not the solution to the con-
cerns. 147 A better approach is to implement a more limited reform to the
current system-to address the limitations of the current system while at
the same time maintaining the independence of the judicial branch. 1 48 As
discussed above, criticisms of the current system can be placed in one of
two categories. First, the chief judge may have a tendency to dismiss a
complaint without adequate investigation. Second, there is a sense that the
current system does not provide any continuity from one complaint to the
next because the resolution of a complaint has no precedential value with
regard to future complaints. Any revisions to the system should seek to
ensure that these limitations (whether real or perceived) are addressed.
Both of these concerns could be addressed through appointment of a mag-
istrate judge to hear and consider misconduct complaints.
Currently magistrate judges are authorized to perform a number of
activities when designated by an Article III judge-from deciding certain
pretrial matters to conducting certain trials.149 Federal judges have not
been hesitant to designate magistrate judges to make recommendations in
a number of types of cases.15 0 In fact, magistrate judges are commonly
designated to hold hearings on and make recommendations on prisoner
claims challenging their confinement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5
Utilization of a magistrate judge, appointed by the chief judge of the
circuit, to initially review misconduct complaints, hold hearings on the com-
plaints, and make a written recommendation to the chief judge could pro-
vide a sense of independence and credibility to the system that some
believe is currently lacking. When the chief judge receives the magistrate
judge's recommendation, she would have the option of doing one of three
things: (a) accept the magistrate's recommendation in full; (b) accept part
of the magistrate's recommendation and reject part of the finding; or (c)
146. The complaint in the Real investigation was filed in February 2002, and the case was decided
in September 2005. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 425 F.3d at 1179.
147. For a proposal for more significant modifications to the current disciplinary system, see
Bazalon, supra note 144.
148. Although this article has focused on the misconduct aspect of the Act, the Act also addresses
judicial disability. While this subject is not expressly discussed, the procedures set out here apply
equally to complaints alleging judicial disability as judicial misconduct.
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (West 2005).
150. See generally, Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (July
1983).
151. D. Utah Civ. R. 72-1 - 72-3.
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reject the magistrate's finding. If the chief judge rejects the recommenda-
tion of the magistrate in whole or in part, she should be required to state in
writing the reasons for rejecting the findings. Once the chief judge has
either accepted or rejected the magistrate's recommendation, the appeal
procedures set out in the current act would remain unchanged.
Implementing a system of magistrate review also addresses some of
the inherent concerns in the current system. Magistrate judges, who are
Article I judges, would be one step removed from the "guild mentality"
that currently faces the chief judge. The magistrate would be charged with
investigating and making a written recommendation to the chief judge.
While the recommendations would likely result in a similar number of dis-
missals as are occurring with chief judge review, the review by the magis-
trate will result in a written recommendation for each complaint filed.
While the chief judge may act simply to adopt the recommendation of the
magistrate judge, the recommendation itself will address the specific issues
raised in the complaint - replacing the form dismissals currently used by
some chief judges. By providing more detailed explanations to complain-
ants, the public concern or perception that the judiciary is ignoring miscon-
duct is lessened.
To implement the magistrate review into the current system, the Act
will need to be amended to provide that the chief judge shall appoint a
magistrate to receive complaints related to judicial misconduct and disabil-
ity. Under the current system, upon receipt of a complaint, the court clerk
is directed to transmit the complaint to the chief judge of the circuit.'5 2
This could easily be amended to provide that upon receipt of a complaint it
would be transmitted to a magistrate judge, and that the magistrate judge is
responsible for conducting an investigation, holding a hearing (if neces-
sary), and submitting a written recommendation to the chief judge.
While adopting an initial review by a magistrate will remedy many of
the problems with the current system, some of the problems under the Act
cannot be addressed merely by incorporating a magistrate to review com-
plaints. The concern regarding piecemeal misconduct and the hesitancy of
"insiders" to file complaints against judges are inherent in a self-regulating
system. However, both of these concerns can be addressed to some extent
with the adoption of magistrate judge review. First, there is nothing in the
Act (or Rules adopted by the Judicial Conference to govern complaints
under the Act) that excludes consideration of a judge's cumulative conduct
in determining misconduct. The Rules could easily be amended to add an
express provision that consideration past conduct should be considered
when evaluating a complaint.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current system for addressing judicial misconduct in the federal
system is flawed. The primary criticisms are directed at how complaints are
152. 28 U.S.C. § 351(c) (West 2002).
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initially reviewed and investigated. Currently, the chief judge of each cir-
cuit receives the initial complaint and either dismisses the complaint or re-
fers it to the circuit's judicial council. The system has raised questions
regarding the effectiveness of allowing judges to regulate the conduct of
other judges. The examples of Judges Real and McBryde seem to justify
the concern of those who are that the current system of regulation needs to
be reevaluated. In fact, members of Congress have introduced legislation
to modify the current system to include an outside review (in the form of
an inspector general).
The congressional concerns may be well-founded, but the proposed
legislative cure is more harmful than the disease. This article proposes a
limited modification of the current system to incorporate an initial review
of misconduct complaints by a magistrate appointed by the chief judge.
The magistrate will then make recommendations to the chief judge after
reviewing the complaint and conducting an investigation if necessary. This
provides a modest but significant change to the current system of complaint
resolution. The incorporation of magistrate judges into the process can
provide more assurance to congressional leaders who want to know that
every complaint is being taken seriously. However, the proposal retains
the self-regulatory nature of the current process and incorporates proce-
dures that are familiar to the judiciary and are utilized in similar contexts.
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